Response: Dr. Frankenstein and Today\u27s Professional Biotechnologist: A Failed Analogy? by Westra, Laura
Moral Issues Associated with Bioengineered Species: Stewardship, Abuse and Sustainability 
A partial version of this paper was presented at 
tile TIlird Conference on Agriculture, Food and 
Human Values Society, Varieties of Sustain-
ability, Reflecting on Ethics, Environment and 
Economic Equity, Asilomar Conference Center, 
Pacific Grove, California, May 10-12, 1991. 
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I found this paper to be both instructive and 
problematic at the same time. Instructive, because 
although I had of course heard of Frankenstein, I had 
no direct acquaintance with the actual work, and this 
paper emphasized for me many issues relevant to my 
own research. TIle "problematic" aspect arose primarily 
because of the number of topics covered in the paper: 
questions concerning bioengineered species, the 
meaning of "stewardship" and of "sustainability" 
against a background of environmental abuse, finally, 
even the topic of "ecofeminism" introduced in the final 
portion of the paper. Clearly tilere are links among all 
of these topics: they are not unrelated. The question is 
how much of all of that can be usefully treated in one 
brief paper and in an even briefer response. 
Thus, in the interest ofboth brevity and focus, I will 
focus, generally speaking, primarily on the analogy 
Dandekar and Zlotowski perceive between the original 
Frankenstein and his counterparts in bioengineering 
today. Starting with a sum-up of Dandekar and 
Zlotowski's analysis of the character of the fictional 
Frankenstein, I will then turn to a brief presentation of 
the reality of today's bioteclmoIogy, before assessing 
the analogies and disanalogies. From that standpoint, I 
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will then say a few words about the problems of 
"stewardship," "sustainability," and "ecofeminism" in 
my conclusion. 
Throughout this response, I will not argue for or 
against Dandekar and Zlotowski's interpretation of the 
figure ofDr. Frankenstein. Time does not permit me to 
pursue an independent assessment, and I will simply 
accept their representation of the meaning and 
motivation of the character of Dr. Frankenstein, since 
this is a question of literary interpretation and 
scholarship, hence a secondary question within the 
present context. 
2. Dr. Frankenstein and 
Nonhuman Bioengineered Species: Yesterday. 
The first thing to note is that Dr. Frankenstein 
emerges from the discussion of this paper as a typical 
upper class, well-educated male of his time: arrogant, 
unquestioning of traditional values, self-serving, sexist, 
bence, it goes without saying, speciesist. He is "the 
scientific expert who assumes a right to unmonitored 
experimentation" and who thinks "scientific knowledge 
is a self-legitimating good." He does not doubt either 
his capacity or his" right" to "create" a new life-form, 
yet his self-congratulation quickly turns to distaste: his 
"creation" horrifies and repels him. At the outset, "he 
presumes his quest good in itself'; hence his activity is 
unhindered by 
a) any moral reflection on probable 
consequences, 
b) any respect for the sensibilities of the 
non-scientific public, and 
c) any sense that the nonhuman itselfmight 
be owed respect. 
Finally, Dandekar and Zlotowski further characterize 
Dr. Frankenstein as accepting both Christian and 
Biblical beliefs in regard to nonhuman life and the 
"cultural imperialism" that is based on human 
(specifically male) domination of the earth through 
"scientific progress" and capitalism. 
In essence, Dandekar and Zlotowski see in Dr. 
Frankenstein the precursor of today's bioengineering 
specialists, such as those in plant pathology or the 
agriCultural sciences. They also see in his attitude, from 
bis initial elation at the successful completion of his 
professional efforts, to his belated "qualms" about 
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divided loyalties, a replica of present day counterparts. 
But does the fictional character as it emerges, and his 
relation to the "creature" truly help to understand 
modern day biotechnologies and their creators? For an 
analogy to work, the entities deemed to be analogous 
must be alike in the most relevant respect. The first 
question to raise then, is, Is there a true analogy bere? 
In order to answer this question, we must in turn 
carefully examine today's counterparts to Dr. 
Frankenstein, since only then will we be able to 
determine whether the analogy proposed in fact holds. 
3. Dr. Frankenstein and 
Nonhuman Bioengineered Species: Today. 
Who are today's Dr. Frankensteins? For the most 
part, they are earnest young men and women, employed 
by large, multinational conglomerates, Monsanto, Ciba-
Geigy, Upjohn, and even USDA. Bioengineering is a 
profession like many others, and the "products" of their 
professional activities are only "monstrous" from some 
specific perspectives; as we shall see. On the face of it, 
the final products consist of " new" engineered plants 
ordomesticanimals,but these often look as they always 
did, even though they are different in some significant 
way. A plant may have been bred with a virus so that 
the new creation is both "animal" and "vegetal," and it 
possesses traits the previous plant did not possess. These 
traits are desirable from the standpoint of economics 
and production: on the plus side, they increase yield, 
hence they promise to feed more people more 
efficiently; on the minus side, the new plant has now 
evolved into one with an inbred resistance to a specific 
herbicide. The result is that the bioengineered species, 
heralded as a step forward for environmental safety and 
a step away from chemicals, represents instead a 
pennanent, inescapable link to chemicals, as the new 
creation has a built-in tolerance to a specific herbicide. 
Hence, the chemical corporation gains twice: once, 
when they sell the biotechnology, and second, when it 
ensures thereby "permanent addiction" to its own patent 
herbicide. In contrast, the people and the environment, 
correspondingly lose twice: once because the proposed 
"safe" product ultimately is not, second, when other 
possibly safer, organic and sustainable choices, are pre-
empted instead. 
The October, 1991 issue of The Gene Exchange (Vol. 
2 (3), lists 54 genetically engineered plants (USDA -
nos. 116 to 170), approved from February 5, 1991 to 
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August 7, 1991 (four of these were still under review at 
that time). Nine of these exhibit "tolerance to 
herbicides" ranging from Glyphosate, chlorsulfuron, 
bromoxynil, glutosinate and 2, 4-D, eitber as tbeir sole 
"engineered trait" or as one of a cluster of sucb traits. 
In most cases, the USDA grants pennission while only 
"assuming" that approved tests have been conducted, 
and "confidential business infonnation (is) witbbeld 
from the public during review" (TIle Gene E:uhange, 
op. cit., p. 14). Attempts are made to regulate things in 
various locations. For instance, in 1989 "North Carolina 
enacted the first comprehensive state biotechnology 
law" (ibid, p. 4). Althougb it appeared to be a great step 
forward, and to provide for infonnation to and input 
from the public, in essence its intent was "to protect 
and promote the industry" (p. 4). 
Some of .its problems were: 
a) its ten-member review board only bad one public 
interest representative; 
b) public participation was "at the discretion of state 
regulators," and public bearings were pennitted 
only when NCDA would detennine that signifi-
cant public interest and justification was present; 
c) the COImnissioner was the only one to detennine 
if and when the public would be allowed to 
review cm (confidential business infonnation) 
(ibid, pp. 4-5). 
Since not everyone is aware of the present-day role 
and issues of biotechnology, it seems to me that this 
brief presentation of the climate within which present-
day "creators" work and some of the issues involved 
would not come amiss. Now, where animals are 
involved, the "new" species is once again often "new" 
in only one significant aspect. BGH (Bovine Growtb 
Honnone, or BST, as it is sometimes known), is a 
honnone. Although scientists have not to this date been 
able "to fully detennine how BGH works at the cellular 
level, they know that the honnone stimulated bone and 
muscle growth, metabolic rate and food intake, and milk 
production" (GE, p. 9). Monsanto, American Cyanamid, 
Eli Lilly and Upjolm are producing the honnone in the 
hope of selling it to farmers who would inject their cows 
for increased (and longer) milk productivity. 
What are the differences between people working 
in the field of "monster" (as "unnatural" or "man-made" 
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entities) creation today and in Dr. Frankenstein's time? 
The first and most significant diJference is the relation 
between their respective work and their perceived 
"responsibility to their own species." Today's plant 
pathologist or other biotech specialist is motivated, 
prima facie at least, by the desilre to "feed tbe hungry" 
by increasing productivity. Anecdotally, often the 
response elicited by questioJrlS from a concerned 
environmentalist about ecological safety is "do you 
people want us to allow millions to starve?" And clearly, 
prudential considerations are the easiest to voice in that 
setting, as concerns for the rights or the integrity of 
animals and plants would be dismissed out of hand. 
Of course the implied dichotomy between sustain-
ability and ecology does not exist, and I have addressed 
this question in detail elsewhere in regard to LDC's 
(Westra, Bowen and Behe, Journal of Agricultural 
Ethics, Sept. 1991). In essence the authors of Food 2000 
say tlmt all attempts to separate environmental concern 
from agricultural progress can only give rise to 
"invidious distinctions between environment and 
development" 
These views are based on a misunderstanding 
of the issues. If a country wishes to pay 
attention to tlle economic costs (and benefits) 
of agricultural production--and all countries 
do-it must deal with the environmental costs 
(Food 2000, 1987). 
Hence, what is required is agricultural practices and 
regulations tbat are no longer "ecologically blind in tbeir 
conception, funding and implementation." These must 
be given "ecological eyes" (Food 2000, 1987; cpo 
Westra, Bowen and Behe, 1991). 
Nevertheless, even though ecological concern of this 
sort, let alone concern for animal ethics, is not viewed 
as a priority by biotech "creators," the human concern 
remains paramount theirs is an anthropocentric position 
of responsibility toward the human species, not a stance 
based on selfishness. The conflict faced by the original 
Dr. Frankenstein no longer exists: rightly or wrongly, 
his latter-day counterparts are convinced that what they 
do represents "progress" and is "for the bettennent of 
mankind." There appears to be no opposition between 
professional and personal fulfillment and the "duty to 
the species" in this context. Nor is the present-day 
Frankenstein a "creator" in the original sense: Dandekar 
and Zlotowski say "he is the scientist-technician 
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bending dead matter to his. wil1." But today's 
bioteehnologists manipulate existing, live "matter;" they 
do not "create" ex nihilo. The "new" life form is only 
so in a partial sense: both virus or micro-Qrg,mism and 
plant, for instance, were "life-fonns" in their own right, 
before being joined. 
Finally, there are great differences among those who 
accept Biblical and Christian beliefs. Although 
Dandekar and Zlotowski correctIy cite Biblical passages 
from Genesis, there ill'e tIlOse today who interpret 
Christian scriptures in a different vein. For instance, 
the Christian Farmers of Ontario and Alberta (Cillmda) 
publish a joumal entitled Earthkeeping. These are 
primarily Dutch reformed or Mennonite farmers. Most 
run family operations, and economic considerations are 
as important to them as to illlY other fanner. Yet, one 
can find articles and features raising questions about 
the morality and godliness of interfering with the 
physical integrity of animals, even to increase 
production. For instance, the use of BGH, discussed 
above, is rejected by these farmers precisely on 
Christian grounds, as interfering with tile" integrity of 
creation," or God's plan for the world. Hence, a 
Christian position may entail respect for all that exists, 
as well as (or instead of) the arrogant attitude witll which 
the autIlOrs identify Christian beliefs. 
To sum up, the major differences between tile 
original and latter day Frankenstein, centre on 
a) the motivation of tIleir research, 
b) the way the product of the research is viewed, and 
c) tile very basis and fonnat of such research. 
Aside from these common features, other differences 
may be present as well. 
Let us now tum to the proposed analogy: what 
are the similarities between the fictitious Dr. 
Frankenstein and the real ones? What is the lesson 
to be learned form the original work and the proposed 
analogy, if any? 
4. Dr. Frankenstein: The BI'eakdown of an Analogy. 
As noted in the two previous sections, Dr. 
Frankenstein is not like his present day counterpart in 
many respects. Nor is tile variety of bioengineered 
species anything like tile "creature." Finally, even the 
relation between creator illld tile created does not appear 
to carry the same overtones or to elicit the same 
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successive emotions. What remains constant tIlen and 
now? What is left is a cluster of general features, 
a) tile total lack of moral concem, 
b) the way tile scientific enterprise is viewed, and 
most important, 
c) tile presence of tile same logical fallacy in tIleir 
respective reasoning. 
The error of perceiving scientific questions as "purely 
technical", rather tIlan involving moral issues and 
values, persists today, as does the high and almost 
unassailable status of the "scientist" or "expert." Enough 
has been written on both problems by such well-known 
tIlinkers as Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Mark Sagoff, 
Helen Longino and otIlers that tIlere is no need to repeat 
their arguments here. As far as (c) is concemed, the 
logical confusion it indicates is still rillnpilllt today. Few 
acknowledge the vast gulf separating theory and 
practice, and tIms they confuse tile right to free thought 
and belief with that of practice; hence, the right of free 
scientific investigation with that of action or 
technological application. 
The right to tile latter, however, is not privileged: it 
must be limited, as all activity, by the right of otIlers to 
safety and freedom from harm. Lately, a further 
dimension has been added to this obvious tenet. The 
definition of " moral patients" or tile targets of such 
moral considerability is by no means as clearly defined 
as it might have been in Frankenstein's time. Hence, 
those who recommend caution and care are not 
improperly attempting to limit tile soaring of tile human 
(scientific) spirit: they are simply (minimally) 
recommending respect for others. 
Aside from tIlese general aspects of similarity, there 
are more problems with the proposed analogy, and even 
with the use made of it. For instance, it seems to me 
tIlat tile "creature's" plea for direct ratIler than indirect 
duties on the part of humans, the recognition of his 
creator's power to decide is confused with the 
acceptance of tile latter's illltIlfopocentrism. Dandekar 
and Zlotowski say, "Frankenstein's creature declares 
itself willing to accept tile antIlfopocentric perspective" 
when he pleads for his own intrinsic value. But 
subsequently tIley suggest that anthropocentrism is 
transcended. "Frankenstein's creature... nevertheless 
demilllds tImt its maker directly recognize its needs." 
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Dandekar and Zlotowski appear unsure, but this seems 
a clear case of demanding one's rights, rather than 
requesting compassionate stewardship. 
Further, it seems difficult to compare the 
"destructive practices of industrial (or for that matter, 
agricultural) polluters who fill their own environment 
with carcinogens" to the relation between Frankenstein 
and the creature. The latter's concern is individualistic; 
the appeal to environmental concern, as well as that to 
Aldo Leopold and "biotic right," are holistic instead. 
No concern for a single animal "creature," or even 
species, is ever analogous to a holistic concern for the 
ecosystem which represents the life-support system on 
which individuals and groups depend. The two 
approaches are different in kind from one another. 
"Stewardship," like ''nonwanton'' use, "the promotion 
of legitimate interests," and even "clemency" and "com-
passion" are all concepts based on anthropocentrism, 
inimical to the intrinsic value ofnonhuman entities and 
lacking respect for their rights (ifany) or their survival: 
they all remain expressions of speciesism. Finally, there 
is a basic disanalogy between even an intrinsic valuel 
individual rights based doctrine, and Aldo Leopold's 
"Land Ethic," or any other ecosystem-based approach. 
The latter supports the moral considerability of an 
ecosystem, an entity that is only "alive" in a specific 
way and that is neither "sentient" nor such that "it 
recognizes and defends its own interests." 
Hence, Dandekar and Zlotowski are correct in 
arguing for the necessity to transcend current anthropo-
centric paradigms in the service of the interdependent 
community of life on earth. TIley are equally correct in 
perceiving technology as a real threat on several levels. 
They are, however, incorrect in proposing Dr. 
Frankenstein, his "creature" and their respective relation 
as a valid analogy to the present relation between 
biotechnologist and bioengineered species, or in 
thinking that the moral problems arising within the 
former might help in formulating answers for the latter. 
5. Conclusion 
Biotechnology poses moral problems at both the 
theoretical level and at the practical one. The 
theoretical problems need to be clearly worked out, 
in a timely manner, while economic interests continue 
to expand the use of biotechnologies without 
allowing the public any input in the decision to do 
so, or clearly understanding the moral and social 
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implications and possible consequences. One is 
reminded of the nuclear industry and their rush to 
license facilities without any clear understanding of 
how safe storage of radwaste material might be 
effected. The Society for Ethics and Animals should 
be an excellent forum to design plans to deal with 
this issue, perhaps starting from the question raised 
by the Christian Farmers mentioned earlier: should 
we not respect the integrity of each creature? What 
separates justifiable paternalistic intervention (such 
as inoculations against disease or protection from 
parasites, both of which kill life-forms in an implicit 
hierarchical ranking), from unjustifiable intrusion? 
VanDeVeer's work on "interspecific justice" may 
provide a starting point for future discussion. 
Nor is the problem only one of concepts, attitudes 
and worldviews; the urgent problem is one of 
establishing guidelines and rules to implement 
protection from harm. Biotechnologies have been 
heralded by their manufacturers as providing salvation 
from possible problems, yet they are far from problem 
free. Dr. Margaret Mellon, J.D. (Director, Biotech-
nology Regulations, World-wide Wildlife Federation), 
has listed no less than eight pos~,ible clusters ofproblems: 
1) they may not be safely used in areas where living 
organisms (human and nonhuman) are mal-
nourished or unhealthy; 
2) the possible "combined impact of the rapid genetic 
improvement of the world's major commodity 
crops Ulreatens to deprive millions in Ule Third 
World of their livelihoods," while advantaging 
multinationals and larger producers; 
3) although these are presented "as ending the era of 
chemical agriculture," Uley will "shackle the world 
to herbicides for the foreseeable future" (as we saw 
in sec. 2); 
4) the promised increased yilelds may, paradoxically, 
increase the misery of millions of poor farmers; 
and finally, and perhaps worst of all, 
5) "biotechnology diverts all of us from the better 
path of sustainable agriculture." Dr. Mellon says: 
The World Resources Institute...just released 
a study Ulat concluded Ulat if the costs of 
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agriculLure are fully accounted-that i~, if the 
cost of walcr pollution and ~oil ermion were 
put into the equation-low input, aJternati ve 
agrieulLure systems perform heller than 
conventional agricuJLure, and the former, 
rather than hiolcchnology is the path that will 
eventually feed people without destroying the 
environment (Mellon, 91). 
On the question of health, three more problems arise: 
6) biotechnology poses environmental rish: tra.its can 
be transferred to crops' "weedy relatives," 
especially in LOC's; 
7) once genes are put into food crops for pesticides, 
they cannot be washed off and may pose risks to 
humans, as yet not fully comprehended (e,g. BT 
toxin); 
8) risks exist from these technologies to wildlife, 
particularly fish. 
In the face of such overwhelming problems, 
Dandekar and Zlotowski are to be commended for 
bringing the topic of bioengineering into the open. On 
the other hand, even at best, Dr. Frankenstein, as we 
have seen, raises questions of human attitudes to 
individual, nonhuman rights. The problems raised by 
today's biotechnologies instead are global and holistic 
and require urgent answers. I doubt that a consideration 
of Dr. Frankenstein's dilemma will suggest any new 
answers. Even the final suggestion, that it is 
Frankenstein's male chauvinism which dictates his 
adversarial, confrontational position toward nature----, 
while probably correct to some extent, receives a prob-
lematic answer in the paper's appeal to ecofeminism. 
Time will not pennit a lengthy analysis of this 
question, which I discuss elsewhere (for a short version 
of my position, see the latest APA Newsletter on 
Feminism and the Environment). Ecofeminism is 
essentially a form of feminism, hence a position 
seeking individual rights and aggregate, social 
recognition. From a policy-making perspective, this 
indicates that if a question of priorities arose, these 
would be sought before ecological concern, indicating 
again the possibility of conflict between the individual 
and the holistic stance. Dandekar and Zlotowski 
themselves suggest that holistic considerations are 
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necessary to indicate solutions to the acute environ-
mental challenges that face us. To that end, it seems to 
me, the analogy with Dr. Frankenstein and his creature 
does not really hold, and the hope for answers arising 
from it is not justified. 
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